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1. Introduction 
It is often thought that science or coincidence can explain why an ill person sud-
denly recovers or broken car starts running, yet both may actually be work of 
God. 
Ph.D. plasma physicist & space scientist Ilkka Sillanpää (Helsingin Sanomat, 
15.8.2014). 
Why do seemingly rational and analytic people believe in the supernatural? How 
come 55 % of natural scientists believe in Extra Sensory Perception (Wagner & 
Monnet, 1979)? Why do only 28 % of American biology high-school teachers advo-
cate Darwin’s evolution theory (Berkman & Plutzer, 2011) but instead 29 % believe 
that some people can see into the future with psychic powers (Eve & Dunn, 1990)? 
What makes over half of college students think there is purpose in random natural 
events (Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012)?  
The idea that magical and religious beliefs operate outside the reflective mind has a 
long history. William James (1902) argued that human personality can be divided 
into a conscious A-region and a subconscious B-region, of which the latter includes 
automatic behaviour patterns, prejudices, compulsions, dreams, quirks, and intui-
tions. Specifically, James saw the B-region as a source of religion:  “In persons deep 
in the religious life -- the door into this region seems unusually wide open” (1902, p. 
484). Similar analogy was drawn by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl when he stated that “[super-
natural] is not then a matter of cognition, but rather of feeling”  (1935, p. 32).  
Recently, many researchers have suggested that paranormal and religious beliefs 
might originate from the automatic information processing tendencies of the mind 
(e.g. Barrett, 2000; Baumard & Boyer, 2013; McCauley & Cohen, 2010; Nemeroff & 
Rozin, 2000). For instance, when describing religion Scott Atran claims that our in-
nate cognitive architecture “makes it natural to render a supernatural interpretation of 
events under conditions of uncertainty” (2002, p. 57). While this so-called by-
product theory denies that religiosity and paranormal thinking themselves develop 
naturally, it suggests that certain cognitive biases make paranormal representations 
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such as a concept of a god luring and easy to remember, allowing the representations 
spread out effectively in the culture. 
Despite our biases there is a large number of people who do not believe in any para-
normal and religious phenomena. Consequently, it has been proposed that some peo-
ple are less inclined to cognitive biases than others and that a tendency to think ana-
lytically might play causal a role (e.g. Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). Following the paradigm of dual-process 
theories, paranormal believing may be considered a failure of mind to suppress intui-
tive biases. To put it more strongly, a cognitive weakness hypothesis (see Irwin, 
2009) claims that believers are generally expected to be illogical and uncritical rather 
than analytical. Indeed, several studies have shown evidence that believers are more 
prone to intuitive thinking and less inclined to think analytically than sceptics (Aar-
nio & Lindeman, 2005, 2007; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Pennycook et al., 2012; Sadler-Smith, 2011; 
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).  
Yet, the rationale why analytical thinking should lead to scepticism is vague. For 
example, Pennycook and colleagues (2014) propose that analytic thinkers are likely 
to be sceptics since they detect easily conflicts between paranormal representations 
and the material world. This seems unlikely, since scientists have shown to perceive 
religion and science mutually complementary (Ecklund & Park, 2009). As Ph.D. 
Ilkka Sillanpää stated, he finds conflicting explanations equally possible even when 
it is about a car failure.  
The goal of the present thesis is to clarify whether both analytic and intuitive groups 
can be found among paranormal and religious believers and sceptics. Should groups 
of such kind exist, it will be then investigated whether there are differences in the 
cognitive biases and analytic skills between the groups. Given the complexity of par-
anormal believing, there is likely to be a number of different trajectories that may 
lead either a sceptic or paranormal worldview (Gervais, 2013; Kalkman, 2013; Mor-
gan, 2014). Supportive evidence for different groups could have major theoretical 
implications. For example, if some believers are very analytical, their believing may 
3 
 
 
appear in a more rationalising manner rather than being motivated by intuitions. In 
contrast, scepticism could be driven by plain ideology instead of analytic tendencies. 
 
1.1. Model of mind: a background framework for the study 
1.1.1. From dual-process theories to tripartite theory 
The notion of human thought having two separate realms has long existed. Tradition-
ally the division has followed the Freudian idea of a battle between the subconscious 
and the conscious mind, in which implicit automatic processes contribute much to 
our  explicit behaviour (for a historical review, see Frankish & Evans, 2009). In the 
modern dual-process theories (e.g. Evans, 1989; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996), 
the mind is perceived as having two distinctive systems through which the infor-
mation flows. An autonomous mind is considered evolutionary old, independent of 
the working memory, and serving as a default response by affecting thoughts with 
fast automatic associations and biases. Conversely, a reflective mind is conceived as 
evolutionarily new, dependent of the working memory, and facilitating volitional 
inhibitory behaviour via slow abstract and rule based reasoning (e.g. Evans, 2008). 
Instead of talking about two architectural systems, Evans (2009) has recently sug-
gested focusing on the two types of processes (namely type 1 and type 2) and their 
differences. In the literature, type 1 processes are often called “intuitions” inasmuch 
as they are automatic background processes that integrate perceptual information, 
construct representations and schemes, and act as an input for the conscious though  
(Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). Type 2 processes, on the 
other hand, require often conscious effort and are determined by their dependency on 
working memory which type 1 processes lack. For instance people can readily count 
from one glimpse that there are two complete paragraphs in this page, but counting 
all the 311 words requires additional cognitive effort. Further differences between 
type 1 and type 2 processes are presented in Table 1.   
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Table 1  
 
Features of Type 1 and Type 2 Processes (Evans, 2008; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012) 
 
Type 1 process  
 
Type 2 process  
Holistic Analytic 
Automatic In control 
Independent of working  memory Dependent of working memory 
Fast Slow 
Associative Rule Based 
Acquired through birth and experience Acquired through cultural teaching 
Parallel Serial 
Evolutionary old Evolutionarily recent 
Domain specific Domain general 
Usually subconscious or pre-conscious Often explicit 
Low correlation on IQ High correlation on IQ 
 
Stanovich (1999, 2005, 2011) has proposed a more elaborated model of the human 
reasoning system, a so-called tripartite model of the mind (see Figure 1). In this 
framework The Autonomous Set of Systems (later TASS) consists of perceptual in-
formation processing, modular responses, reflexes, emotional inputs, conditional 
responses as well as previously learned rules and skills. The operation of these pro-
cesses is ballistic. This means that if an object shares properties with a stimulus for 
which the module has been selected in the course of natural selection, the activation 
of the system is inevitable. For example, seeing a person automatically activates the 
face recognition module, the social inference module, the theory of mind module, 
and other basic perceptual modules. Furthermore, when a cultural representation – 
say, a god – imitates the properties of the evolutionary domain, the module is said to 
have a cultural domain (Sperber, 1996). A god has many properties, such as agency, 
causality, knowledge, morality, and emotional safety, that activate many cognitive 
5 
 
 
modules, allegedly making a god an intuitively appealing representation (Barrett, 
2004; Boyer, 2003). 
 
Figure 1. Tripartite model of mind (Stanovich, 2009). 
The autonomous mind can manage on its own, but since it is a computer built by 
evolution, it is programmed to fulfil the goals of the genes instead of the person (Sta-
novich, 2005). While most of the time this strategy pays off well, relying on the most 
salient information or judgement that comes to mind without deliberation sometimes 
puts the person in a disadvantageous position, especially when the situation resem-
bles nothing like those problems faced by our ancestors (for dysfunctional intake of 
sugar, see Symons, 1992).  
In order to interrupt our immediate needs and to target more long-lasting life goals 
we need the reflective mind to take control. The reflective mind includes our goals, 
beliefs, and general knowledge; in other words, our epistemological skills (Sta-
novich, 2009). Depending on the situational cues, the reflective mind can initiate the 
overriding of TASS response in favour of a better alternative. As a buffer between 
these two minds operates the algorithmic mind which depicts the person’s cognitive 
efficacy (IQ) (Stanovich, 2009, 2011). The larger working memory capacity and the 
faster processing speed one has, the more easily one can override autonomic re-
sponses by allocating working memory resources to type 2 processing. 
In summary, the evolutionary organization of the human mind means that behaviour 
is largely determined by type 1 processes instead of type 2 processes. But if the per-
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son is motivated enough, type 1 processes can be overridden. The degree of motiva-
tion depends largely on natural tendency to think: one’s thinking style. 
 
1.1.2. Thinking styles 
Thinking styles or cognitive dispositions greatly determine how the person ap-
proaches new information. Thinking styles can be considered a collection of episte-
mological beliefs and goals that direct one’s thinking (Evans, 2009). An analytic 
thinking style means one tends to ponder before making up one’s mind, subsequently 
lessening the likelihood of defaulting perfunctory thoughts. The opposite tendency, 
an intuitive thinking style, is to trust one’s first impression and “let the heart make 
the decision” (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Sloman, 1996). For exam-
ple, if there is a horrible plane crash many initially think about cancelling their up-
coming flight. An intuitive thinker might trust their feeling and cancel the flight 
whereas an analytic thinker might – after some consideration – take a flight anyway. 
Contrary to fixed characteristics such as the working memory, reflective level of 
thinking is malleable insofar as one can be asked to think more or less thoroughly. 
However, thinking styles are possibly determined by personality and they are diffi-
cult to teach in adulthood (Stanovich, 2011). Consequently, there are individual dif-
ferences between the natural tendency to utilise one thinking style over another (Sta-
novich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998). 
Analytic and intuitive thinking styles are typically measured by a self-assessment 
questionnaire such as Reflection-Experiential Inventory (later REI, Epstein et al., 
1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), in which Need For Cognition (later NFC) and Faith 
in Intuition (later FI) scales are posed as orthogonal. A person can be rated as high or 
low either separately or simultaneously on both parameters. REI has a high predic-
tive validity as it can be used to predict social well-being (Epstein et al., 1996), logi-
cal skilfulness (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002; but see 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004), critical thinking (Macpher-
son & Stanovich, 2007) and paranormal thinking (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Lin-
deman & Aarnio, 2006; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999).  
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To recapitulate the dual-process framework of this thesis, even though thinking is 
directed by fast, automatic, and evolutionarily old biases, the reflective mind may 
suppress the automatic responses in a given moment depending on cognitive capacity 
and motivation factors (De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Evans, 2008). Specifically, re-
search has isolated a number of biases that possibly underlie paranormal, supersti-
tious and religious thinking (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001, 2003; Heywood & Bering, 
2013; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Rottman & Kelemen, 2012; Willard & No-
renzayan, 2013). Hence, not only may thinking style indicate a tendency to biased 
thinking, but it may also reveal the differences in paranormal and religious believing. 
Still, in order to be able to evaluate the role of autonomous and reflective mind it is 
imperative first to define the concept of a paranormal belief.  
 
1.2. Paranormal and religious thinking 
1.2.1. Cognitive biases behind paranormal  and religious thinking 
1.2.1.1. Core knowledge confusions 
What exactly differentiates paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural (lat-
er PSMS) beliefs from the other unfounded beliefs, such as conspiracy theories, 
mythical creatures or superseded scientific claims? All PSMS beliefs mix up the cat-
egories of ontological knowledge that one learns early in life (Lindeman & 
Svedholm, 2012). This so-called core knowledge is developmentally fundamental in 
a way that it helps to function in the world, it acts as a framework for future infer-
ences, and is universally learned by preschool age without explicit teaching (Well-
man & Gelman, 1998). Although the exact number of the core knowledge domains is 
currently unclear (see Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), the three most essential domains 
consist of physical, biological, and psychological knowledge about the world (Well-
man & Gelman, 1992). For instance, even a 1-year-old appreciates the physical fact 
that a ball can only be in one place at one time, and is surprised if he or she sees it in 
two places simultaneously (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). Sim-
ilarly, a 1-year-old understands people as intentional agents, a prerequisite for the 
Theory of Mind development (for review, see Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003).  
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Often the ontological borders of these categories get blurry in childhood, that is, 
children tend to do false analogies on mental, physical, and biological properties. For 
example, in the classic studies of Piaget (1929) children were found to confuse cau-
sality of the mental and physical insofar that any mental quality (such as laziness) is 
a part of the physical body and may get transferred upon touching. Similar “law of 
contamination” was already described by Frazer (1922) as a key element of sympa-
thetic magic.   
Thus, with a definition of core knowledge confusion it is possible to separate the 
beliefs that are paranormal from those that are not (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). A 
spirit which has no physical body but which can interact with the world and can be 
heard or felt is, by definition, a PSMS belief. Dragons or giants, then, are not PSMS 
beliefs but only non-existent biological creatures.  
Given the popularity of paranormal and religious beliefs, it comes as no surprise that 
categorical borders of core knowledge have been found to remain flexible even for 
adults (Lindeman, Svedholm, Takada, Lönnqvist, & Verkasalo, 2011; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013a). Indeed, core knowledge confusions predict the amount of para-
normal beliefs in adults (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, 
& Lipsanen, 2015; Svedholm, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2010). Since ontological 
knowledge is implicit by nature, it is possible that people can hold their misconcep-
tions in TASS through adulthood despite later education.  
Ontological confusions is not the only suggested bias behind the paranormal and 
religious beliefs. There seems to be a tendency to attribute purpose on things, which 
may partly explain the common idea of creationism and destiny. 
 
1.2.1.2. Promiscuous teleology 
Teleology (Greek: telos, τέλος [purpose] and logia, λογία [study]) is a philosophical 
standpoint to explain something in terms of its purpose or goal. Even though it is 
correct to explain the existence of a human-made object like a hammer in terms of its 
purpose, it is incorrect to claim that clouds are for raining or trees are for birds to 
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nest. Thus, promiscuous teleology over-attributes purpose beyond the domains of its 
normal use. 
Promiscuous teleology has been studied extensively by Kelemen and her colleagues 
(see reviews, 1999a, 2004). They have shown evidence that while adults attribute 
purpose mostly on human-made objects, pre-school children perceive that there is a 
reason even for the existence of animals and natural objects (Kelemen, 1999b, 
1999c; Kelemen & DiYanni, 2005). Kelemen’s rationale for this bias is as follows 
(Kelemen, 1999a): First, children have innate ability to perceive intentional behavior 
of other agents. Secondly, by perceiving the use of tools and items children construct 
a teleo-functional view of the entities. Finally, by analogical reasoning they associate 
purpose on other domains of life. Interestingly, under a cognitive load or with im-
paired inhibitory control even adults make unwarranted teleological judgements that 
resemble those of the children (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen et al., 2012; 
Lombrozo, Kelemen, & Zaitchik, 2007). The results indicate the bias remains for the 
adults, albeit beyond the reflective deliberation. 
There is conflicting evidence whether teleological thinking has a causal role for par-
anormal and religious beliefs. Kelemen (2004) has stated that pre-school children are 
“intuitive theist”, as children’s explanation for the origin of the entities often in-
volves God. However, it is difficult to assess the role of ideological exposure on 
these studies. For example, in one of the studies (Kelemen & DiYanni, 2005) 85 % 
of the children from ages 6 to 10 had a religious background.  
Even though adults generally do not attribute purpose on natural events, significant 
life events often raise a question whether the situation had a higher meaning. Does 
the idea of fate represent another cognitive bias? 
 
1.2.1.3. Purpose of life events 
In the layman’s view, dramatic events often call for an explanation when the occur-
rence seems too improbable to be random. For example, meeting a person in a 
jammed elevator that eventually leads a life-long relationship may bring out a 
10 
 
 
thought that the incident happened for a reason. In a religious context the purpose is 
then often rationalized by the act of God (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014). Indeed, seeing 
purpose in life-events has recently been associated with religiosity (Heywood & Ber-
ing, 2013; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). 
Yet, the important theoretical question is whether promiscuous teleology and seeing 
purpose in life underpin the same domain-general cognitive bias. As a support for 
this conclusion Banerjee & Bloom (2015) showed that children from 5 to seven fa-
vored teleological explanations for life events and that these answers were independ-
ent from the exposure to religion. These findings parallel the seminal studies of Kel-
emen (1999b, 1999c) in which children favored teleological explanations for natural 
objects. Additionally, tendency to attribute purpose on life events is also evident for 
the non-believers, although in lesser manner when compared to the believers 
(Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; Heywood & Bering, 2013).  
Another viewpoint is that teleology reflects mixed-up ontology. Rather than resulting 
from the analogy of tool use, core knowledge confusions may explain both teleologi-
cal biases. In fact, teleological thinking is conceptually close to the tendency to con-
fuse a mental properties - namely intentionality - with biological and physical objects 
(Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). The findings consisting of children’s teleological 
preference are in line with the notion, that ontological borders are stretched during 
the childhood (Piaget, 1929; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Providing further support, 
not only teleology correlates positively with ontological confusions (Lindeman & 
Saher, 2007; Svedholm et al., 2010), but recent structural equation models suggests 
that core knowledge confusions explain the variance in promiscuous teleology and 
seeing purpose in life events (Barber, 2014; Lindeman et al., 2015; Svedholm et al., 
2010). Paralleling the finding that teleological explanations increase under cognitive 
load (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), core knowledge confusions are also shown to in-
crease under cognitive load (Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b). 
Should teleological thinking stem from ontological confusions that operate at the 
level of the autonomous mind, it is likely that the differences in the reflective mind 
determine how well this bias is suppressed. For example, those with intuitive think-
ing style should be susceptible to teleology, especially if the surrounding culture en-
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dorses such beliefs. Not much is currently known about the role of analytic and intui-
tive thinking style in terms of teleological biases.  
To summarise, although each culture has their own characteristic expressions of par-
anormal beliefs (Banerjee & Bloom, 2013; Gervais & Henrich, 2010), their seeds 
seem to be laid in the modular architecture of the mind that predisposes people to 
have similar cognitive biases  (see Atran, 2002; Boyer, 1994). In spite of the fact that 
cognitive biases may hinder our ability to categorise an entity as impossible or possi-
ble, it does not explain why increasing number of people worldwide find themselves 
sceptics. Although people may share the similar modular architecture of the mind, by 
no mean does it imply that people are predetermined to share similar beliefs. By as-
suming there is more variation in the operation of reflective mind than autonomous 
mind (De Neys, 2006), it is integral to consider what sort of impact the reflective 
mind has on paranormal and religious believing. The differences in the reflective 
mind may not only account for susceptibility of TASS biases but also determine how 
firmly one is willing to held onto their beliefs (Stanovich, 2005, 2011). 
 
1.2.2. Intuitive, analytic and reflective thinking 
1.2.2.1. Cognitive miserliness and belief flexibility 
The research of cognitive biases was launched by Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 
1973; 1973) who showed that normal people often act irrationally in simple tasks. It 
was not that these tasks were demanding in terms of cognitive capacity but that peo-
ple used their mental power scarcely. Humans seem to be ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991; but for a caveat, see Gilovich & Griffin, 2002), that is, they have 
difficulties in resisting automatic heuristics and biases of the mind which efficiently 
organise the unstoppable information flood.  
Much of research has tried to explain individual differences in cognitive miserliness. 
After the IQ is controlled, thinking styles are found to explain the remaining variance 
in heuristic tasks (Stanovich, 1999). Those who are prone to trust their initial impres-
sions are more prone to heuristic answers (Epstein et al., 1996; Macpherson & Sta-
12 
 
 
novich, 2007). Therefore, not so much cognitive capacity, but differences in episte-
mological beliefs and goals (i.e. thinking styles) strongly determine the degree to 
which a person acts as a cognitive miser (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014). 
However, not all biases are alike. Some involve defaulting to TASS response, where-
as others are more associated with the way the reflective mind operates (De Neys & 
Bonnefon, 2013; Stanovich, 2005). For example, there is evidence that even partici-
pants with high NFC tend to change their answer depending on the context, reflect-
ing a so-called framing bias (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). In other 
words, even though people utilize type 2 processing when creating a mental model, 
they are often satisfied with it without going deeper in their thinking (cognitively 
miserliness via “serial associative cognition” as coined by Stanovich, 2009). To be 
able to question one’s own beliefs and goals requires more than resisting intuitive 
responses. 
Belief flexibility measured by the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (AOT, Sta-
novich & West, 1997), reflects the tendency to assess one’s own beliefs from a criti-
cal point of view, and the likelihood to change one’s opinions upon contradictory 
evidence. Dogmatism and counterfactual thinking are some of the subscales of the 
AOT scale. The scale could then be considered a kind of a metacognition measure-
ment, though the exact validity of the scale has not properly been addressed. For ex-
ample, there is no clear discriminant validity between the Actively Open-minded 
Thinking and the Need For Cognition scales. While both the AOT and NFC scales 
correlate positively with the resistance of miserly thinking (Toplak et al., 2014) and 
heuristics tasks (West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), one study on middle school aged 
children showed that only the AOT scores correlate strongly with analytic reasoning 
skills like inductive and deductive thinking (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2002). Without a better agreement this thesis uses the definition of Top-
lak, Stanovich, and West (2011, p. 802) in which AOT reflects belief flexibility and 
NFC reflects enjoyment of thinking and tendency to seek information. 
To wrap it up, thinking may go awry at different levels of processing. Cognitive mi-
serliness mainly stems from the biases reflecting a failed suppression of type 1 re-
sponses (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Reflective beliefs themselves 
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also pose a source of erroneous thinking (Stanovich, 2005, 2011). Thus, there are 
possibly multiple routes for paranormal believing, only some of which have been 
subject of psychological research so far.    
 
1.2.3. Intuitive and analytic thinking styles in believers and sceptics 
Many researchers have previously treated the psychological mechanisms underlying 
paranormal and religious beliefs as predominantly intuitive (Atran, 2002; Boyer, 
2001), and even innate (Bloom, 2007; Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 
2011; but see Woolley, 2000). However, given the complexity of paranormal or reli-
gious ideas, the formation of a PSMS belief is likely to be influenced by both intui-
tive and reflective processes (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Morgan, 2014; Willard, 
2015). A possible scenario is presented next. 
At some point of life (possibly during bias-ridden childhood) culturally learned su-
pernatural beliefs, albeit first being reflective, eventually become a part of TASS and 
serve as a-priori knowledge when accounting for new evidence. With the normal 
human tendency to dismiss contradictory information (possibly reflecting metacogni-
tive skills), one is trapped to a domain specific “island of false knowledge” (Sta-
novich, 1999). Potential analytic skills are then used in rationalizing one’s own be-
liefs and effectively reject opposing views (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2005). To fur-
ther prevent belief-revision, many paranormal and religious beliefs come bundled 
with implicit or explicit orders like “misfortunate befalls you if not going through 
these rituals” or “one shall not question the holy book”. These second order meta-
beliefs also give the affirming context for otherwise unusual beliefs (Pyysiäinen, 
2004).  
In this sense, a paranormal or religious belief is different from the type 1 responses 
that can be overridden by analytic thinking. As a consequence, analytical thinking 
style per se may not be sufficient in decreasing paranormal and religious beliefs once 
such kind of worldview has been established. As such, it is likely, that there are ana-
lytical people among paranormal and religious believers (hypothesis 1). 
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Despite the cognitive biases that make people susceptible to paranormal thoughts, 
not everyone becomes a believer. The logical answer would be that some people are 
less affected by these biases. At least three possible explanations appear. 
Firstly, scepticism can be driven by the environmental factors (Gervais & Henrich, 
2010; Gervais et al., 2011). For example, if an individual is raised in a culture that 
does not include a notion of god, it follows that “cognitive modules that evolved to 
posit intentionality and agency are satisﬁed with concepts of human agency and have 
no use for concepts of supernatural agency” (Kalkman, 2013, p. 79). If the cognitive 
biases are not encompassed by supernatural context, scepticism could be present 
even for the intuitive thinkers. Given that Finland is rather secular country where 
scientific values are widely appreciated (Kiljunen, 2013), in the present thesis an 
intuitive group is expected to be found among the sceptics (hypothesis 1). 
Secondly, there could be individual differences in TASS itself. For example, some 
percentage of people tend automatically to process information in a manner that 
leads them to see faces in random dot-patterns (Riekki, Lindeman, & Raij, 2014). It 
may well be that some people inherently process information in a more biased man-
ner which makes paranormal representations more believable for them. To date, no 
evidence is available whether differences in automatic processes attribute to scepti-
cism. 
Thirdly, it is plausible that some individuals are better at overriding TASS responses. 
In fact, many studies have associated the analytic thinking with paranormal and reli-
gious disbelief (e.g. Browne, Pennycook, Goodwin, & McHenry, 2014; Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b). The 
simplified logic goes as follows:  
1. Humans have default intuitive (type 1) cognitive biases that make them sus-
ceptible to paranormal and religious ideas.   
2. Analytical people are inclined to suppress intuitive cognitive biases. 
3. Ergo, analytical people are less affected by the paranormal and religious ide-
as.  
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Preliminary evidence suggests that during logical tests sceptics default less to type 1 
processing and more to type 2 processing than believers, even when cognitive ca-
pacity, socio-economic status, education, and sex are accounted for (Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013). When focusing on the thinking styles, Aarnio 
and Lindeman (2005) found that the analytic style is negatively associated with para-
normal beliefs, although the correlation was only -.14, whereas the intuitive thinking 
style was positively correlated at the level of .34. Furthermore, the complete picture 
is not very clear, as some studies have failed to associate analytic thinking style with 
paranormal unbelieving (Genovese, 2005; King, Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007; 
Yates & Chandler, 2000), and one study has connected a simultaneous high intuitive 
and analytic thinking style with paranormal believing (Wolfradt et al., 1999). 
Additionally, from a theoretical standpoint the connection between analytical think-
ing and scepticism remains vague. For example, Browne and his colleagues have 
suggested that irreligiousness of analytical thinkers is “strongly related to the extent 
to which they favour external and objective sources of knowledge when determining 
their ontological worldview” (Browne et al., 2014, p. 740), thereby allowing sceptics 
to detect the conflict between supernatural beliefs and knowledge about the material-
istic world. This statement is tautology as it merely claims that analytical thinkers are 
sceptics because they favour sceptic explanations. Moreover, the conclusion has the 
causal structure in the wrong order. The ontological worldview is not determined by 
the analytical thinking style, but is constructed during the childhood, a period when 
the mind is full of ontological confusions and vulnerable to accept cultural infor-
mation and the views of authorities (Chinn & Brewer, 2000; Sperber, 1997). Only at 
the later point of life possibly learned analytic thinking skills may be used for epis-
temological scrutinising (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011; Toplak, West, & Sta-
novich, 2013). The present thesis puts forward an alternative viewpoint for the cur-
rent theoretical confusion: neither intuitive nor analytic thinking specifically describe 
paranormal believing and scepticism. Rather, intuitive and analytic thinking have 
complementary role in the build-up to both worldviews.  
It is important to investigate whether there are natural analytic and intuitive sub-
groups among the paranormal and religious believers and sceptics. While the exist-
ence of these groups would not invalid that in general analytic thinking correlates 
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with sceptics and intuitive thinking style with believing, it might shed some light on 
the heterogeneous nature of both believers and sceptics. 
Given the findings that biased thinking is associated with intuitive thinking style (e.g. 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b), intuitive thinkers should 
be more likely to be influenced by the biases in TASS, such as teleology, belief in 
the purpose of life events, and core knowledge confusions. Furthermore, if there are 
sceptics who happen to be intuitive thinkers, they should similarly show heightened 
inclination to the mentioned biases (hypothesis 2). In contrast, if there are believers 
with analytical tendency, they should have less biases than intuitive sceptics. Here, 
paradox emerges: if analytic thinkers are able to resist in defaulting to type 1 re-
sponses more efficiently than intuitive sceptics (hypothesis 3), how could there be 
paranormal believers among them in the first place?  
Partial escape from the problem has recently been given by Risen (2015). In her du-
al-system model certain people indeed recognize the error in intuitive magical re-
sponse but choose not to correct it. Using Risen’s term, reflective mind acquiesces to 
initial intuitive response. It is then possible that analytic believers may not be cogni-
tive misers in – say – mathematical problems, as they recognize the error and are 
motivated to correct it. In contrast, for paranormal and religious beliefs there are like-
ly to be other factors present that render reflective mind acquiescent to TASS. 
Metacognitive tendencies, such as belief flexibility, may be one of the factors that 
determine the motivation to correct biased response. More research is needed, as 
current studies involving metacognitive tendencies and paranormal or religious 
thinking are scarce. The few correlations between actively open-minded thinking and 
paranormal and religious thinking have been moderate, ranging between -.34 and -
.49 (Toplak et al., 2013; Pennycook et al., 2014; Kokis et al., 2002). Taking these 
findings into account, should there exist an analytic subgroup of believers, they 
probably have lower belief flexibility compared to the analytic sceptics (hypothesis 
4).  
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1.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
The main focus of the study is to investigate whether there exist both analytic and 
intuitive groups within sceptics and believers and whether the groups differ in terms 
of cognitive biases, cognitive miserliness and belief inflexibility. Considering the 
previous research and unaddressed conundrums the following hypotheses are pro-
posed: 
Hypothesis 1 There are subgroups among paranormal believers, reli-
gious believers and sceptics that differ in terms on analytical and intuitive 
thinking styles. 
Hypothesis 2 Intuitive groups are more inclined to have core knowledge 
confusions and teleological biases involving natural objects and life events 
than analytical groups. 
Hypothesis 3 Analytical groups are less prone to defaulting to type 1 re-
sponses (i.e. cognitive miserliness) than intuitive groups. It is left open 
whether being a believer is associated with a heightened cognitive miserli-
ness.  
Hypothesis 4 Analytic sceptics have more flexible beliefs than analytic 
believers. It is left open whether intuitive sceptics have more flexible beliefs 
than analytic believers. 
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2. Methods 
2.1. Participants and procedure 
Three thousand and eighty-six people, 1056 male and 2026 female, took part in the 
study. The mean age of the participants was 28 years (29 and 27 for male and female, 
respectively) ranging from 15 to 69 with standard deviation being 8.85. 64.3 % of 
participants classified themselves as students, 26.4 % were in working life, and 9.2 % 
answered “something else”. From those who were students 32 % were currently in 
comprehensive school, 1.6 % in upper secondary school, 3.1 % in vocational school, 
4.7 % in polytechnic, and 58.3 % in university. 51.2 % of participants had no denom-
ination, 45.9 % belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church and 2.9 % belonged to 
an unspecified church. If a participant had 25% or more missing items on a scale, the 
sum variable for that scale was not calculated for that participant, thus resulting a 
loss of 265 participants. Due to the size of the data no additional procedures were 
done for the missing values. 
The participants were recruited to the on-line study via several Finnish language 
open internet discussion forums, several student mailing lists, and from a participant 
pool comprising of individuals who had expressed an interest to participate in our 
studies. No exclusion criteria for participation were applied. The participants were 
told that the study concerned thinking and personality, and confidentiality and volun-
tary participation were emphasized. In the messages sent out to the internet forums 
(e.g. Suomi24) and mailing lists, a hyperlink to the questionnaire was included. The 
respondents were given 3 weeks to participate in the study. They could either fill in 
the survey in one sitting or save their responses and continue later. Participants were 
not technically prevented from answering more than once. However, half of the par-
ticipants gave their e-mail address to participate in our future studies, and no e-mail 
address appeared twice. As compensation, all participants received a thinking style 
profile based on the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale (Stanovich & West, 
1997) included in the survey. 
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2.2. Assessment methods 
2.2.1. Grouping variables 
2.2.1.1. Religious and paranormal beliefs 
Eight items (α = .94) from the Supernatural Belief Scale (SBS, Jong, Bluemke, & 
Halberstadt, 2013) were used to measure religious beliefs (e.g., ‘‘There exists an all-
powerful, all-knowing, loving God’’). Paranormal beliefs were assessed with 15 
items (α = .94) from the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, which assesses beliefs in 
astrology, telepathy, and precognition, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, and psy-
chokinesis (RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004). To avoid item overlap, two items were excluded 
from the original 10-item SBS, and five items (mainly from the Religious Belief sub-
scale) were excluded from the original 26-item RPBS. Following the suggestions of 
Lindeman and Svedholm (2012), an additional six items were removed from the 
RPBS because they were too culture-specific (e.g., belief in the Loch Ness Monster) 
or dated (e.g., a black cat crossing a road brings bad luck). The participants indicated 
their opinion about the statements on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5= 
strongly agree). To divide groups into sceptics and believers, a median-split (1.53 
and 1.75 for paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs, respectively) was used. In 
terms of paranormal beliefs, 683 male and 773 female were treated as sceptics and 
339 male and 1169 female were treated as believers. In terms of religious beliefs, 
672 male and 833 female were treated as sceptics and 352 male and 112 female were 
treated as believers. 
2.2.1.2. Thinking dispositions 
Analytical and intuitive thinking dispositions were measured using the 22-item Ra-
tional-Experiential Multimodal Inventory (REIm; Norris & Epstein, 2011). The items 
were rated on a 4-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree). In the full 
form the 42-item inventory includes, within the experiential scale, additional emo-
tionality and imagination subscales, which were not included in the questionnaire. 
The experiential thinking scale consisted of 10 items measuring the tendency to rely 
on and enjoy making intuitive judgements, (e.g. “I tend to use my heart as a guide for 
my actions”). The rational thinking scale consisted of 12 items measuring the ten-
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dency to rely on and enjoy analytical pondering, (e.g. “I prefer complex to simple 
problems”). Variables were formed for the overall Faith in Intuition (FI) scale (10 
items, α =.76) and overall Need For Cognition (NFC) scale (12 items, α = .86). 
 
2.2.2. Cognitive biases 
2.2.2.1. Core ontological confusions 
Fourteen statements (α = .85) from the Core Knowledge Confusions scale (Lindeman 
et al., 2008; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007) were used to measure ontological confu-
sions. All statements concerned only the kinds of properties (i.e., verbs) that children 
learn to associate appropriately with mental, physical, animate, inanimate, and living 
and lifeless phenomena during the preschool years (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001; 
Wellman & Estes, 1986). Example statements were ‘‘Earth wants water’’, ‘‘A house 
knows its history’’, and ‘‘A mind breaks when it is ill’’. To acquaint the participants 
with the task, they were first presented with examples of metaphorical (e.g. ‘‘Friends 
are the salt of life’’) and literal statements (e.g. ‘‘Sibelius was a composer’’). Then in 
the task, the participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale whether the statements 
were fully metaphorical (1) or fully literal (5). To avoid response bias the scale also 
included six fillers consisting of three metaphorical (e.g. “Howling wind is a flure”) 
and three literal statements (e.g. “Flowing water is liquid”). 
2.2.2.2. Promiscuous teleology 
Six teleology statements (α = .75) were derived from the studies of Kelemen and her 
colleagues (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen et al., 2012). In the instructions, the 
participants were told that they will receive descriptions and explanations of some 
natural phenomena. The participants’ task was to judge whether the explanations 
were bad (scored 0) or good (1). The more statements a participant evaluated as good 
explanations, the higher that person’s teleological bias. Example statements were 
‘‘Earthworms tunnel underground to aerate the soil’’ and ‘‘Mosses form around 
rocks to stop soil erosion’’. The scale also included three filler items (e.g., ‘‘Soda 
fizzes because carbon dioxide gas is released’’) 
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2.2.2.3. Purpose of life events 
These beliefs were measured using nine statements (α = .94, Lindeman & Aarnio, 
2007). The statements described random (e.g., dealing cards in a card game), artifi-
cial (e.g., a server failure), and natural events (e.g., fog) that lead to personally rele-
vant outcomes, and they were derived from the Life Experience Survey (Sarason, 
Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). Only positive outcomes were included because people 
assess intentional events with positive outcomes to have more supernatural purpose 
than other events (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). The participants were given the fol-
lowing instruction: ‘‘Events may be seen as having a purpose. Imagine the following 
events happening to you. What would you think about the purposiveness of the 
event?’’ They were then asked to indicate on a five-point scale whether they per-
ceived the events as purposeful (1 = the event had no purpose ,5= the event clearly 
had a purpose). Example items include: ‘‘Your flight is delayed because of fog, and 
at the airport you meet the person whom you will get engaged to a year later. Did the 
fog have a purpose?’’ Three items describing intentional actions of humans (e.g. 
kissing, bullying) were used as fillers. 
 
2.2.3. Reflective thinking variables 
2.2.3.1. Resistance of cognitive miserliness 
Cognitive miserliness was measured by Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 
2005). The tests consist of three mathematical problems in which participants are 
cued with a heuristic but incorrect answer. For example, the first question states “A 
bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?” There is an intuitive answer that pops right into mind, namely 10 c. The 
correct answer, however, is 5 c. It requires considerable effort to inhibit this strong 
type 1 answer and to replace it with decoupled (imagined) type 2 answer. In fact, 
more than half of undergraduate students tend to fail in all three questions (Toplak, 
West, et al., 2011). The test also taps general cognitive ability and rational thinking 
skills (Toplak, West, et al., 2011) and it correlates with a wide range of heuristic 
tasks (Toplak et al., 2014) and scepticism (Pennycook et al., 2012). 
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Correct answers were labelled as ‘reflective’, wrong heuristic answers were labelled 
as ‘intuitive’ and wrong but non-cued were labelled as ‘other’. As it has been ques-
tioned whether heuristic answers measure intuitiveness (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koeh-
ler, & Fugelsang, 2015), only correct ‘reflective’ answers were used in the analyses. 
2.2.3.2. Belief flexibility 
The Actively Open- Minded thinking (AOT) scale (Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999) 
was used to assess belief flexibility. Subscales of the scale consist of flexible think-
ing, openness-values, dogmatism, categorical thinking, belief identification, and two 
items of counterfactual thinking. The subscales measure, for example, willingness to 
switch perspective and decontextualize, and a tendency to consider alternative opin-
ions and evidence. In total, the scale (α = .84) includes 41 6-point items (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 6 = Strongly agree), such as “Changing your mind is a sign of weakness” 
(flexible thinking). 
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3. Results 
The relationships between research variables were investigated with correlation coef-
ficients shown in Table 2. Due to the large sample size all relationships were statisti-
cally significant. 
Table 2  
Correlations Between Measures 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. FI        
2. NFC  -.363      
3. Core knowledge 
confusions 
 .306 -.256     
4. Teleology  .297 -.268 .436    
5. Purpose of life 
events 
 .423 -.266 .425 .404   
6. CRT  -.267 .370 -.256 -.319 -.252  
7. AOT  -.151 .230 -.366 -.272 -.291 .134 
Note. All the correlations were statistically significant p <. 001. FI, faith in intuition; 
NFC, need for cognition; CRT, cognitive reflection test; AOT, actively open-minded 
thinking.  
 
3.1. Paranormal believers and non-believers 
To examine the natural combination of intuitive and analytical thinking among be-
lievers and sceptics two agglomerative hierarchical cluster analyses were conducted. 
The purpose of a cluster analysis is to combine individuals into natural groups in 
terms of designated variables and continue the grouping until the clusters represent 
meaningful populations (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011; Hair, 2006). Squared 
Euclidian distance and the Ward minimum variance was used as clustering algorithm 
since this method tends to create homogenous clusters of similar size (Everitt et al., 
2011). Need for cognition and faith in intuition were transformed to z-values before 
the cluster analysis in order to equalize their statistical weight. 
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For sceptics, two and three cluster solutions did not show intuitive groups. A four 
cluster solution (presented in Table 3) revealed three groups that had higher need for 
cognition than faith in intuition and one group that had higher faith in intuition than 
need for cognition, supporting hypothesis 1. Cluster number 1 was selected to repre-
sent analytical sceptics and the cluster number 4 was selected to represent the intui-
tive sceptics in further analyses. The intuitive group represented 16 % of the total 
sample of sceptics.  
 
Table 3  
Results of the Cluster Analysis Among Sceptics 
Variable 
Sceptics 
Cluster #1  
(N = 457) 
Cluster #2  
(N = 422) 
Cluster #3  
(N = 297) 
Cluster #4  
(N = 219) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
FI 2.19 .34 2.29 .21 2.79 .22 2.92 .21 
NFC 3.53 .25 2.84 .29 3.11 .24 2.40 .31 
Note. FI, faith in intuition; NFC, need for cognition. 
 
For paranormal believers, a two cluster solution did not show an analytical group. A 
three cluster solution (presented in Table 4) revealed two groups that had higher need 
for cognition than faith in intuition and one group that had higher faith in intuition 
than need for cognition, supporting hypothesis 1. Cluster number 2 was selected to 
represent analytical believers and cluster number 1 was selected to represent intuitive 
believers. Cluster number 3 was a complementary group (need for cognition and 
faith in intuition were both high). This last cluster was excluded from the analyses. 
The analytical groups represented 30 % of the total sample of believers. 
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Table 4  
Results of the Cluster Analysis Among Paranormal Believers 
Variable 
Paranormal believers  
Cluster #1 (N = 793) Cluster #2 (N = 431) Cluster #3 (N = 191) 
M SD M SD M SD 
FI 2.89 .36 2.46 .26 3.12 .22 
NFC 2.51 .31 3.19 .26 3.28 .24 
Note. FI, faith in intuition; NFC, need for cognition. 
 
Thus, four groups were selected for further analyses and named as analytic sceptics, 
intuitive sceptics, analytic believers and intuitive believers. Need for cognition and 
faith in intuition differed between the groups (ps <. 001) except for the intuitive scep-
tics and the intuitive believers that did not differ at their level of faith in intuition (p > 
.05). 
Comparisons between the groups were performed by using multiple one-way anal-
yses of variance (ANOVA) separately for each psychological variable. The results 
are shown in Table 5. Additionally, post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted 
with a Bonferroni correction. Statistically significant differences (p < .05) between 
the groups are marked with a letter symbol in the table. 
 
 
  
 
2
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Table 5 
Comparisons of the Variables of Interest Between the Analytical Sceptics (n = 431), the Intuitive Sceptics (n = 180), the 
Analytical Believers (n = 385), and the Intuitive Believers (n = 667) Regarding Paranormal Beliefs 
   
Variable 
Analytical  
scepticsa 
Intuitive  
scepticsb 
Analytical  
believersc 
Intuitive  
believersd 
All  
participants 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F(3, 1659) η² 
Core knowledge confusions 1.63 bcd .46 1.92 acd .56 2.09 abd .54 2.30 abc .60 2.05 .61 133.86*** .19 
Teleology 7.13 bcd 1.38 8.47 a 1.94 8.19 ad 1.78 8.96 ac 1.84 8.29 1.88 87.32*** .14 
Purpose of life events 1.22 bcd .57 1.87 acd 1.06 2.22 abd 1.09 2.71 abc 1.12 2.15 1.16 195.14*** .26 
CRT 2.23 bcd .90 1.23 ac 1.06 1.81 abd 1.08 1.08 ac 1.05 1.56 1.13 125.38*** .18 
AOT 4.70 bcd .41 4.48 ad .40 4.45 ad .42 4.36 abc .41 4.48 .43 55.36*** .09 
Note. The letter symbols indicate the statistically significant (p < .05) differences between the groups a–d. CRT, cognitive reflection test (number of correct 
answers); AOT, actively open-minded thinking. 
*** p < .001 
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In line with hypothesis 2, the intuitive groups were more prone to have core 
knowledge confusions and see teleological purpose in natural objects and life events 
than the analytical groups. However, this was only evident for the groups with simi-
lar thinking style. In fact, analytical believers had more core knowledge confusions 
and they saw more purpose in life than intuitive sceptics. 
In terms of cognitive miserliness the results followed hypothesis 3: the overall per-
formance of the analytical groups in the cognitive reflection test was better than that 
of the intuitive groups. In other words, the analytical thinkers resisted defaulting to 
type 1 responses. The analytical believers had less amount of correct answers than 
the analytical sceptics, although the difference of the mean was smaller than between 
the analytical believers and the intuitive sceptics. The intuitive believers and the intu-
itive sceptics did not differ from each other.  
The absolute differences in belief flexibility between the groups were rather small 
which is indicated by the moderate effect size of the one-way ANOVA. As expected 
by hypothesis 4, the analytical sceptics showed greater belief flexibility than the ana-
lytic believers. Between the intuitive sceptics and the analytical believers the differ-
ence was insignificant. The intuitive believers had the lowest belief flexibility.  
 
3.2. Religious believers and non-believers 
To achieve broader understanding of the subject, it was investigated whether the re-
sults for the paranormal beliefs are similar in respect of religious beliefs. Thus, the 
analyses were replicated separately for the religious beliefs. 
For sceptics, two and three cluster solutions did not show intuitive groups. A four 
cluster solution (presented in Table 6) revealed three groups that had higher need for 
cognition than faith in intuition and one group that had higher faith in intuition than 
need for cognition, favouring hypothesis 1. Cluster number 1 was selected to repre-
sent the analytical sceptics and cluster number 4 was selected to represent the intui-
tive sceptics. The intuitive group represented 23 % of the total sample of sceptics.  
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Table 6 
Results of the Cluster Analysis Among Sceptics 
Variable 
Sceptics 
Cluster #1  
(N = 216) 
Cluster #2  
(N = 403) 
Cluster #3  
(N = 495) 
Cluster #4  
(N = 325) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
FI 2.83 .24 2.36 .17 2.16 .31 2.90 .22 
NFC 3.25 .18 2.79 .28 3.48 .28 2.53 .31 
Note. FI, faith in intuition; NFC, need for cognition. 
 
For religious believers, a two cluster solution did not show an analytical group. In 
support of hypothesis 1, a three cluster solution (presented in Table 7) revealed two 
groups that had higher need for cognition than faith in intuition and one group that 
had higher faith in intuition than need for cognition. Cluster number 2 was selected 
to represent analytical believers and cluster number 1 was selected to represent intui-
tive believers. Cluster number 3 was a complementary group (need for cognition and 
faith in intuition were both high). This last cluster was excluded from the analyses. 
The analytical group represented 23 % of the total sample of religious believers. 
Table 7  
Results of the Cluster Analysis Among Religious Believers 
Variable 
Religious believers 
Cluster #1 (N = 709) Cluster #2 (N = 300) Cluster #3 (N = 317) 
M SD M SD M SD 
FI 3.00 .32 2.25 .21 2.79 .21 
NFC 2.52 .36 3.16 .37 3.17 .27 
Note. FI, faith in intuition; NFC, need for cognition. 
 
Subsequently, four groups were selected for further analyses and named as analytic 
sceptics, intuitive sceptics, analytic believers and intuitive believers. The need for 
cognition and faith in intuition showed a difference between the groups (p <. 001) 
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apart from the intuitive sceptics and the intuitive believers that did not differ at their 
level of need for cognition (p > .05). 
Comparisons between the religious belief groups were performed by using multiple 
one-way analysis of variance separately for each psychological variable presented in 
(Table 8). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted with a Bonferroni correc-
tion. Statistically significant differences (p < .05) between the groups are marked 
with a letter symbol on the table. For the sake of comparison, the group means de-
picting paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs are shown in Figure 2 to 6.  
Consistent with the hypothesis 2, the intuitive groups were more inclined to have 
core knowledge confusions than the analytical groups (see the dark bars in Figure 2). 
However, this was only true when comparing groups separately within sceptics or 
believers. When comparing against intuitive sceptics, the analytical believers had 
more core knowledge confusions. 
 
Figure 2. Means of the core knowledge confusions among the groups of interest. Error bars 
represent 95 % CI. 
 
 
  
 
3
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Table 8 
Comparisons of the Variables of Interest Between the Analytical Sceptics (n = 470), the Intuitive Sceptics (n = 268), the 
Analytical Believers (n = 275) and the Intuitive Believers (n = 594) Regarding Religious Beliefs 
   
Variable Analytical  
scepticsa 
Intuitive  
scepticsb 
Analytical  
believersc 
Intuitive  
believersd 
All  
participants 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD F(3, 1603) η² 
Core knowledge confusions 1.63 bcd .46 1.96 acd .56 2.03 abd .55 2.32 abc .61 2.02 .62 136.23*** .20 
Teleology 7.14 bcd 1.37 8.27 ad 1.85 8.11 ad 1.77 9.10 abc 1.83 8.26 1.88 109.66*** .17 
Purpose of life events 1.18 bcd .49 1.82 acd 1.01 2.08 abd 1.02 2.87 abc 1.11 2.10 1.17 286.36*** .35 
CRT 2.21 bcd .89 1.26 ac 1.08 1.86 abd 1.07 1.10 ac 1.06 1.58 1.13 117.41*** .18 
AOT 4.71 bcd .40 4.52 ad .41 4.46 ad .44 4.34 abc .40 4.49 .43 61.29*** .17 
Note. The letter symbols indicate the statistically significant (p < .05) differences between the groups a–d. CRT, cognitive reflection test (number of correct 
answers); AOT, actively open-minded thinking. 
 *** p < .001 
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For teleological thinking hypothesis 2 was partially favoured. Within sceptics and 
believers intuitive thinking heightened teleological answering. A cross-comparison 
between the analytical believers and the intuitive sceptics showed no difference. (see 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Means of teleological thinking among the groups of interest. Error bars represent 
95 % CI. 
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In terms of purpose of life events results showed descending order in which perceiv-
ing purpose was most common for the intuitive believers and least common for the 
analytical sceptics (see Figure 4). Somewhat against hypothesis 2, the analytic be-
lievers saw more purpose in life than intuitive sceptics  
 
  
Figure 4. Means of believing purpose in life events among the groups of interest. Error bars 
represent 95 % CI. 
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For cognitive miserliness the results were identical to paranormal beliefs (see Figure 
5): the number of corrects answers in the cognitive reflection test was higher for the 
analytical groups than for the intuitive groups, thereby supporting hypothesis 3. The 
analytical believers had lower score than the analytical sceptics, but again the differ-
ence of the mean was smaller than between analytical believers and the intuitive 
sceptics. The intuitive believers and the intuitive sceptics did not differ significantly 
from each other.  
 
Figure 5. Mean number of correct answers in cognitive reflection test among the groups of 
interest. Error bars represent 95 % CI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
In line with hypothesis 4, the analytical sceptics again showed greater belief flexibil-
ity than the analytic believers (see Figure 6). No difference was present between the 
intuitive sceptics and the analytical believers. Intuitive believers had the lowest belief 
flexibility.  
 
Figure 6. Means of actively open-minded thinking among the groups of interest. Error bars 
represent 95 % CI. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1. Analytical believers and intuitive sceptics: empirical support 
No studies have previously attempted to explore whether there exist groups with dif-
ferent thinking styles among the paranormal and religious believers and sceptics. The 
lack of evidence is problematic because intuitive thinking is often depicted as charac-
teristic for believers and analytic thinking likewise for sceptics. This thesis showed 
important preliminary evidence that the believers and sceptics are rather heterogene-
ous groups. Indeed, not all the believers were intuitive thinkers nor were all the scep-
tics analytical. 
As a key finding, an analytical group was identified among the paranormal and reli-
gious believers. Albeit this has never been straightforwardly predicted before, many 
authors have argued that even rational and smart people may believe in magical, su-
perstitious, paranormal and religious concepts (Hood, 2009; Irwin, 2009; Risen, 
2015). The thesis also showed evidence for the existence of intuitive group among 
the sceptics. The finding is in favour of the recent arguments about disbelief emerg-
ing without analytical thinking (Gervais & Henrich, 2010; Kalkman, 2013).  
Importantly, the analytical believers and intuitive sceptics were not mere outliers. For 
example, 44 % of the paranormal believers were classified as having greater trust in 
analytical than in intuitive thinking. Similarly, a sizeable proportion of the sceptics 
(16 % and 22 % for paranormal and religious beliefs, respectively) were classified as 
intuitive thinkers. The existence of these “unusual” subpopulations suggest that theo-
ries of paranormal and religious beliefs may require revision. Possible ideas are dis-
cussed more in-depth in later sections. For instance, different cognitive biases may 
have varying causal importance in paranormal beliefs. 
 
4.2. Paranormal beliefs involve different type of cognitive biases 
At least three intuitive cognitive biases are presumed to underpin paranormal and 
religious beliefs, namely core ontological confusions, promiscuous teleology, and 
perceiving purpose in life events (e.g. Kelemen, 2004; Svedholm, 2013; Willard & 
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Norenzayan, 2013). In this thesis, all groups were found to confuse the properties of 
core ontological knowledge at some degree. This was most common for intuitive and 
believers groups, replicating the results that have linked the bias with the intuitive 
thinking style and paranormal thinking (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013b). Interestingly, the analytical believers mixed up the ontological 
categories more than the analytical sceptics.  
Promiscuous teleology was common for all of the groups. It was least apparent for 
analytical sceptics and most present for intuitive believers. These findings agree with 
the studies where teleological explanations increase when adults are forced to think 
intuitively during a cognitive load (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen et al., 2012). 
Since no difference was found between analytical believers and intuitive sceptics, it 
can be concluded that teleological thinking can be common regardless of one’s met-
aphysical views. In fact, an alternative perspective on teleology has been presented 
by Waxman, Medin & Ojalehto (2013). They argue that simply a relationship be-
tween entities merits an idea of purpose. For example, it is not unwarranted to per-
ceive that a rugged stone is – in the given context – for the animal to scratch. While 
the intuitive thinking style may rightly be associated with seeing reason in natural 
entities, it does not necessarily lead to supernatural explanations. 
In terms of perceiving purpose in life events, a distinctive order for the groups was 
found. This bias was more common if the person was either an intuitive thinker or a 
believer and most prominent if both. Once again, the bias was quite common even 
for the sceptics. This is consistent with previous studies showing that non-believers 
show some teleological tendency towards life events (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; 
Heywood & Bering, 2013). All in all, the results regarding teleological thinking was 
very similar to those of core knowledge confusions. This may suggest that a belief in 
supernatural purpose may originate from core knowledge confusion involving mental 
properties, in other words, attribute of intention is given to natural events or unani-
mated objects, as discussed recently (Lindeman et al., 2015; Svedholm et al., 2010).  
Core knowledge may stand as an intervening factor between type 1 processes and 
paranormal beliefs. To quote Aarnio (2007, p. 6), “paranormal beliefs mainly arise 
from an intuitive system, instead of a malfunctioning analytical system, [which] ex-
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plains why the beliefs do not vanish with the increase of education, scientific 
knowledge, and rational thinking”.  Since core knowledge confusions are believed to 
stem from false childhood analogies, they may then remain as a complementary ex-
planation model alongside with scientific knowledge (Rosengren & Hickling, 2000; 
Subbotsky, 2004). Although current study cannot clarify this, all groups were none-
theless prone to core knowledge confusions.  
Will blurry ontological boundaries lead a person to regard some scientifically impos-
sible phenomena as possible? The opposite may as well be true, that is, a cultural 
environment that values paranormal representations could act as a catalyst for keep-
ing the ontological gates open for an individual. Taken all together, core knowledge 
confusions and paranormal thinking are likely interdependent (Lindeman et al., 
2011). Future longitudinal studies should address these questions.  
The cultural impact for paranormal beliefs cannot be understated. Even though type 1 
biases are powerful mechanisms in directing our thinking towards the paranormal, 
the beliefs themselves are of type 2 nature, that is, reflective. Rather than being in-
stantaneous and universal, they are formed via human communication, are held con-
sciously, and their appearances depend on the culture (Sperber, 1996). Ultimately, it 
is a culture that put one’s intuitive biases into a context that makes sense. Science 
can explain the phenomena involving core knowledge, such as physics or biology, 
but not the confusions where laws of the universe do not apply. This is where the 
field of magic and religion steps in.  
Rituals or doctrines act as validating motive for otherwise strange notions. A con-
cept, such as “a soul lives on after the body has decayed”, is validated by the second-
order belief that the Bible is always truthful (Pyysiäinen, 2004). As a consequence, 
there are an infinite number of representations that can be reflectively believed in. 
Practically, though, only certain beliefs survive through cultural selection. Those 
beliefs that exploit the domain of multiple cognitive modules and that do not violate 
core knowledge too harshly (Atran, 2002) are the most successful ones to spread. 
Boyer’s (1994) list of the optimal properties of paranormal representation includes an 
ability to answers fundamental questions, access to omnipotent knowledge, and the 
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involvement of rituals. These requirements are met, obviously, by a god, the most 
widespread paranormal representation. 
In order to perceive the whole picture of paranormal and religious beliefs it is neces-
sary to examine the biases beyond the autonomous mind and judge the potential ef-
fects related to the reflective mind. Given the moderate presence of cognitive biases 
among the intuitive and analytic sceptics, the findings might imply that thinking 
styles per se may not push towards believing or scepticism. 
 
4.3. Cognitive miserliness does not define whether one believes or not 
Considering the previous research, the results of the cognitive reflection test were 
surprising. Although the general findings were in line with Toplak et al. (2014; 
2011), that is, defaulting to type 1 responses was less typical to analytical people 
than intuitive people, being an analytical believer only marginally affected the capa-
bility to supress type 1 responses. This is conflicting evidence as believers are previ-
ously shown to default type 1 responses more than sceptics (Pennycook et al., 2014, 
2013, 2012). Since Pennycook and his colleagues did not compare the groups by 
thinking styles, believers’ worse performance can simply result from the larger num-
ber of intuitive thinkers among them. Yet, this thesis indicates that some of the be-
lievers can efficiently resist cognitive miserliness. Because analytical believers 
should also be able to inhibit automatic biases, such as core knowledge confusion 
and teleology, their nevertheless heightened susceptibility for these biases requires 
further explanation. 
First, mathematical-logical heuristics measured by the cognitive reflection test are 
very different from the biases involved in paranormal beliefs. The former depend on 
our tendency to not think thoroughly, i.e. act as cognitive misers (Stanovich, 2011; 
Toplak et al., 2014), whereas the latter depend much on false ontology and the mis-
firing of evolutional information processing modules. Although both heuristics and 
cognitive biases operate at the level of autonomous mind, people have more control 
over their momentary behavior than their cognitive predispositions.   
39 
 
 
Secondly, even though the analytic believers may trust their analytic skills in every-
day problems involving work or family, their beliefs are under influence of biases 
that are harder to tackle. It is possible that even if a person was 1) highly analytical, 
2) able to suppress many pitfalls of thinking, and 3) intelligent and successful, the 
person could still have irrational beliefs (why smart people act stupid, see Sternberg, 
2008).  
Indeed, the findings of the present thesis posit the term “analytic thinking style” as a 
misnomer. Given that “analytic” is often used synonymously with “rational”, it goes 
against the expectations that analytic people believe in paranormal concepts. By con-
trast, if having analytic thinking style means something else, the findings become 
more understandable. 
It has been argued (e.g. Petty et al., 2009; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002), that the need for 
cognition is not de facto a measurement of rationality. For example, Svedholm and 
Lindeman posit that the need for cognition is not measuring “what researchers on 
reasoning mean by rationality” (2013b, p. 315). The Need For Cognition scale taps 
only a minuscule aspect of rationality, that is, willingness to spend time on thinking. 
However, one can keep confabulating unjustified ideas without showing any rational-
ity (Evans, 2010; Evans & Over, 1996). Spending more time on a problem enhances 
the ability to notice conflict in tasks where there is a heuristic answer involved (Pen-
nycook et al., 2014). Question for future research is whether analytic believers are 
hastier jumping to conclusion when the conflict involves their personal beliefs in 
contrast to other people’s beliefs or mathematic-logical heuristics.  
Similarly, an intuitive thinking style does not entail a notion of irrationality but rather 
means giving priority to trusting gut feelings over thorough pondering (Pacini & Ep-
stein, 1999). One group that was prone to both cognitive biases and cognitive miser-
liness was intuitive sceptics. As pointed out by Kalkman (2013), scepticism may 
emerge without need of overriding biases if the particular environment do not give a 
paranormal or religious context to the biases.  
Due to education and a possible personal interest to science, an intuitive person 
might identify with a sceptic worldview and have sceptic knowledge to buffer 
against paranormal beliefs. This does not rule out the possibility that the person may 
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be predisposed to cognitive biases, such as teleology, but these may not be powerful 
enough to affect their reflective sceptic worldview. Occasional lapses from scepti-
cism may nevertheless happen. Future studies should address whether highly intui-
tive sceptics hold implicit or momentary idiosyncratic superstitions or paranormal 
beliefs even though they deny them explicitly in self-assessment questionnaires.  
 
4.4. Paranormal thinking in a broader context: Human irrationality 
Consistent with recent finding that show positive association between belief flexibil-
ity and paranormal disbelief (Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b), belief flexibility was 
most prominent among the sceptics. Importantly, despite having a nearly similar 
thinking style profile, analytic believers had lower belief flexibility than analytic 
sceptics. Analytic believers also had marginally lower belief flexibility when com-
pared against intuitive sceptics.  
These results underline the aspect of rationality that need for cognition misses. In a 
so-called broad rationality view (also known as epistemological rationality), what 
matters is how consistent person’s beliefs are with the reality (Stanovich, 2005). In a 
thin view of rationality (also, instrumental rationality), one can be rational by suc-
cessfully fulfilling their personal goals and beliefs. The emphasis in the latter view is 
whether the behaviour is appropriate given the held beliefs, not whether the beliefs 
themselves are appropriate. Hence, people may act in accordance with their beliefs 
and be rational in an instrumental way, but simultaneously fail to adjust their beliefs 
about the world to match reality.  
Theoretical confusion arises since most thinking style inventories measure thin ra-
tionality instead of broad rationality (Stanovich, 2011). In contrast, Actively Open-
minded Thinking scale taps broad rationality as high belief flexibility indicates a 
motivation to revise one’s own beliefs (Baron, 1993; Stanovich & West, 1997). In 
this thesis, believers were less willing to re-evaluate their beliefs than sceptics. Alt-
hough this finding seems self-evident, no causal factors can be pointed out partly due 
to the limitations of a cross-sectional study.  
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Indeed, three questions are left for future research:  
1. Is belief flexibility a reflective skill that can be improved? 
2. Does exposure to certain cultural information hamper the rational thinking 
skills, all other things being equal? 
3. Is paranormal believing associated with diminished tendency to revise all be-
liefs in light of contradictory evidence or only regarding paranormal beliefs?  
It is worthy to notice that paranormal and religious concepts themselves can be dete-
riorating to rational thinking inasmuch as they exploit the pitfalls of both the auton-
omous and the reflective mind. Concepts like creationism, fate, and soul exploit intu-
itive cognitive biases, rendering them easy to adopt (Sperber, 1996). At the reflective 
level, the representations are often bundled with rules that prevent the scrutiny of the 
logical aspects of the concepts or forbid questioning their viability (Pyysiäinen, 
2004). It has been argued by Stanovich (2011) that religious representations specifi-
cally are predominantly of parasitic nature, i.e. they do no good nor harm to their 
carrier but aim to become replicated in the culture (but for religious altruism, see 
Bering, 2011; Blackmore, 2000).  
Certain information can also act as a facilitator for rational thinking. Proper educa-
tion of scientific knowledge provides alternative ideas for beliefs that might other-
wise reflect our cognitive biases. A culture without education tends to fill up with 
parasitic representations that exploit our biases, as can be witnessed from anthropo-
logical studies (e.g. Malinowski, 1948; Tylor, 1871). There are some evidence that 
education correlates negatively with superstitious beliefs (e.g. Torgler, 2007; but for 
an argument, see Vyse, 2000). Yet, despite the fact that today’s western world enjoys 
formal education, around 90 % of Americans believe in God (Newport, 2011). Even 
in this thesis over 45 % of analytic believers had university level education. It seems 
that current education system does not provide the proper tools for flexible thinking. 
If society wants to fight against superstitious, magical, paranormal and religious 
thinking, metacognitive thinking should be incorporated into the school curriculum 
alongside with scientific teaching. 
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4.5. Limitations of the study 
The sample in this study was not representative for the Finnish population. A majori-
ty of the participants were required from Internet forums and student mailing lists 
with no exclusion criteria applied. As a consequence the sample was biased towards 
younger participants and female sex. 
Some methodological factors may have affected the results of this study. First, using 
median-split on the paranormal beliefs and religiosity scales to divide sceptic and 
believers has its downsides. In Finland the majority of people are rather sceptic posit-
ing the 50th percentile at the lower part of distribution. Therefore, many of the par-
ticipants in the believer groups are actually rather sceptic. A replication study in a 
population consisting of more paranormal believers might strengthen the effects of 
the group comparison. 
Cluster analysis also serves as a possible source of error. Cluster analysis is an ex-
plorative method, meaning a different statistical choice by the researcher will create 
different cluster solutions. Using method that maximises the difference between 
groups can provide better interpretation of the results, albeit at the cost of group size. 
Moreover, among the sceptics cluster analysis found 3 analytical groups, only one of 
which was chosen. It is possible that there are notable differences within analytical 
sceptics as well as other groups. The complementary group within believers, i.e. 
people with high analytic and intuitive thinking, was likewise omitted from the anal-
yses.  
It can also be argued that comparisons between clustering groups fail to be adequate 
as neither analytic groups nor intuitive groups are identical. For example, analytic 
sceptics have much higher need for cognition and much lower faith in intuition com-
pared to analytical believers. In this sense it is inappropriate to consider both equally 
analytic. But because a a-priori score cannot be determined by which the group 
should be called “analytical”, it is better to look for natural combinations of the need 
for cognition and faith in intuition scores, rather than predetermine the division val-
ues. Only when compared to other groups, it is possible to define whether one group 
is more analytical or intuitive than the other. 
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Furthermore, the separate cluster analyses between religious beliefs and paranormal 
beliefs provided rather neglible differences as both analyses were comprised of 
nearly the same participants. For example 84.4 % of those who were classified as 
analytic sceptics for paranormal beliefs were also treated as analytical sceptics for 
religious beliefs. An interesting approach would be to separate those who believe 
only in paranormal phenomena but not religious beliefs and vice versa. However, 
this would significatly reduce the cell sizes. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
The present thesis has examined paranormal and religious beliefs considering the 
role of cognitive biases, cognitive miserliness, and belief inflexibility. Most previous 
studies have not considered multiple profiles for believers and sceptics but have 
treated them as homogenous groups. This thesis, instead, suggests that among be-
lievers and sceptics there are subgroups for which some underlying factors contribute 
more than other. It is concluded, that dual-process theory offers several pathways 
leading to similar worldviews. 
Unexpectedly, the tendency to default to type 1 responses (cognitive miserliness) 
was less common among believers than often thought. Many believers seem to be 
capable of overcoming their incorrect intuitions, which conflicts the view that that 
believing reflects a weak inhibitory control (e.g. Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pen-
nycook et al., 2012). Also, a large number of cognitive misers end up having a scep-
tic worldview. Taken these results together, it is possible that analytic thinking just 
co-occur with the sceptic worldview without much contributing it.  
It is a bit surprising that cognitive biases, namely ontological confusions and teleolo-
gy towards natural objects and life events, were found to be rather common among 
analytical believers. This may reflect the prolonged exposure to paranormal beliefs, 
which has prevented these childhood intuitions from being replaced by scientific 
ideas. Why do not intuitive sceptics, whose core ontological knowledge gets mixed 
up, believe in paranormal phenomena as well? The answer remains unclear. One 
possibility is that they have grown up in a sceptical and secular environment which 
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has acted as a buffer against their innate tendencies. Alternatively, loose ontological 
boundaries affect only intuitive thoughts, but have no direct impact on one’s reflec-
tive belief system. Therefore, the person can hold a rational view of world despite 
biased intuitions (Subbotsky, 2000). 
Before the researchers define the causal factors for paranormal and religious think-
ing, it is also crucial to separate the conditions for when the beliefs are originally 
acquired (usually in childhood) and when they are being studied in laboratory. Dif-
ferent factors can have a different role in a certain age. For example, epistemological 
regulation may be truly possible only from mid-childhood, implying that very young 
children are vulnerable to both cognitive miserliness and parasitic representations. 
Only later on analytic thinking can be used to resists cognitive miserliness, but over-
learned false knowledge presumably requires metacognitive skills. 
For some people paranormal beliefs can reflect their natural way to process infor-
mation. They see signs in random things and associations between fundamental qual-
ities. Just as it is important to isolate factors that contribute to childhood belief acqui-
sition, it is necessary to pinpoint aspects that strengthen the adulthood believing. A 
role of religion must not be ignored. Religion gives paranormal beliefs a firm ground 
for growth. While superstitious beliefs can be more like a habit, or – like Irwin puts it 
– “a tuxedo that is taken out of the closet only when the occasion arises” (2009, p. 
111), religion can be a fundamental way of life, where tradition, holy concepts, and 
identity are tightly intertwined around a paranormal-laden ideology.   
Paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs are not to vanish from 
the world even though scientific education improves. The full understating requires 
psychological, sociological, evolutionary, and anthropological approaches. From the 
cognitive psychology point of view, the dual-process theories offer a framework 
about how intuitive biases make us vulnerable to many paranormal beliefs, and how 
reflective thinking may either protect from them or strengthen them (Morgan, 2014). 
Parasitic nature of some representations helps to acknowledge the causal role of cul-
tural information when explaining superstition and religion. By taking different as-
pects of the paranormal belief into account we are better able to understand the caus-
al factors behind them. 
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All in all, most of us are quite rational in the majority domains of life. When we are 
not, we probably will not even notice it. It is up to science to correct our erroneous 
beliefs. And even though we might never reach full rationality, we may grow to ap-
preciate the limitations of our mind and learn to behave accordingly. 
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